Regional Ocean Governance: The Perils of Multiple-Use Management and the Promise of Agency Diversity by Eagle, Josh
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Faculty Publications Law School 
Spring 2006 
Regional Ocean Governance: The Perils of Multiple-Use 
Management and the Promise of Agency Diversity 
Josh Eagle 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
02__EAGLE.DOC 6/12/2006 11:04 AM 
 
143 
REGIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE 
PERILS OF MULTIPLE-USE MANAGEMENT 
AND THE PROMISE OF AGENCY DIVERSITY 
JOSH EAGLE† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two high-level committees—the United States Commission on 
Ocean Policy (“U.S. Commission”) and the Pew Oceans Commission 
(“Pew Commission”)—have recently issued reports expressing grave 
concerns about the condition of America’s oceans.1 These committees 
 
 † Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. I would like to ex-
press my gratitude to the staff of the Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, in particular 
Sarah Doverspike, Mark Hill, and Ingrid Nugent, for their invitation to, and outstanding organi-
zation of, the symposium. I appreciate the insights of the symposium’s participants, including 
Steve Roady, Donna Christie, and Andy Rosenberg. Catherine Bryan, Sierra Jones, Michael 
Corley, and Callie Campbell contributed excellent research assistance to this project. My thanks 
go to colleagues who provided thoughtful feedback on various ideas, namely Buzz Thompson, 
Meg Caldwell, Jim Sanchirico, Steve Palumbi, Larry Crowder, Carl Safina, and Josie Brown. 
Generous support for this research was provided by the David and Lucile Packard Foundation 
and the University of South Carolina. 
 1. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY (2004) [hereinafter USCOP 
REPORT], available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_ 
full_report.pdf; PEW OCEANS COMM’N, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE 
FOR SEA CHANGE (2003) [hereinafter PEW REPORT], available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/ 
pdf/env_pew_oceans_final_report.pdf. 
President Bush appointed members of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy early in his 
first term, pursuant to the Oceans Act of 2000, which authorized creation of the commission. 
Oceans Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-256, 114 Stat. 644 (2000). The charge to the commission 
included the assessment of policies on living resources, nonliving resources, navigation, and na-
tional security. Members of the commission included: Admiral James D. Watkins (Ret.), Robert 
Ballard (professor of oceanography, University of Rhode Island), Ted A. Beattie (president and 
Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Shedd Aquarium), Lillian Borrone (chair of the board of 
Eno Transportation Foundation), James M. Coleman (professor of coastal studies, Louisiana 
State University), Ann D’Amato (chief of staff for Los Angeles City Attorney), Lawrence 
Dickerson (president of Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc.), Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney, II 
(Ret.) (president of Monmouth University), Marc J. Hershman (professor of marine policy, 
University of Washington), Paul L. Kelly (senior vice-president of Rowan Companies, offshore 
drilling supplier), Christopher L. Koch (president and CEO of World Shipping Council), Frank 
Muller-Karger (professor of biological oceanography, University of South Florida), Edward B. 
Rasmuson (president of the Rasmuson Foundation), Andrew A. Rosenberg (professor, Univer-
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identified the large number of “overfished” American fisheries as an 
important problem.2 When a fishery is overfished and the size of the 
fish population is reduced to a suboptimal level, the result is eco-
nomic harm to both fishermen and consumers.3 Excessive fishing also 
results in harder-to-price damage to marine ecosystems. Both the 
U.S. and Pew Commissions note the declining health of the ocean en-
 
sity of New Hampshire), William D. Ruckelshaus (strategic director of the Madrona Venture 
Group and chairman of the board of the World Resources Institute), and Paul Sandifer (senior 
scientist for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Centers for 
Coastal Ocean Science). 
The Pew Charitable Trusts formed and funded the Pew Oceans Commission in 2000. Mem-
bers of the commission included: Christine Todd Whitman, Leon Panetta, John Adams (presi-
dent of Natural Resources Defense Council), Eileen Claussen (president of Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change), Carlotta Leon Guerrero (co-director of the Ayuda Foundation, a 
nonprofit health care organization in Guam), Mike Hayden (Secretary of Kansas Department 
of Wildlife and Parks), Geoffrey Heal (professor of economics and finance, Columbia Univer-
sity), Charles Kennel (director of Scripps Institute for Oceanography), Tony Knowles (then-
Governor of Alaska), Jane Lubchenco (professor of marine biology, Oregon State University), 
Julie Packard (founder and executive director of the Monterey Bay Aquarium and vice-chair of 
the David and Lucile Packard Foundation), Pietro Parravano (president of Pacific Coast Fed-
eration of Fishermen’s Associations), George Pataki (Governor of New York), Joseph P. Riley, 
Jr. (Mayor of Charleston, South Carolina), David Rockefeller, Jr. (director of Rockefeller Co., 
Inc.), Vice Admiral Roger T. Rufe, Jr. (Ret.) (president and CEO of the Ocean Conservancy), 
Kathryn D. Sullivan (president and CEO of COSI, a hands-on science center), Marilyn Ware 
(chairman of the board of the American Water Works Company), and Patten D. White (CEO 
of the Maine Lobstermen’s Association). The Pew Oceans Commission focused most of its at-
tention on the status and management of the ocean’s living environment. So, for example, it 
commissioned special reports on ocean pollution, fisheries management, aquaculture, and inva-
sive species. These reports are available at www.pewtrusts.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
 2. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 20, 40; PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-9. See NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., STATUS OF UNITED STATES FISHERIES (2004), available at 
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/statusoffisheries/SOSmain.htm. That report indicates that in 2004, 
about twenty percent of major stocks in American federal waters—and twenty-eight percent of 
all stocks—could be classified as overfished. Major stocks are defined as those supporting more 
than 200,000 pounds of catches annually; combined, these represent about ninety-nine percent 
of all U.S. catches. Id. 
 3. Although a slight oversimplification, it is useful to conceptualize a population of wild 
fish as a capital asset. A “sustainable” rate of fishing “spends” only the interest generated by the 
asset, while “overfishing” mines the capital. While mining produces high revenues for a short 
time, it inevitably results in long-term catch levels that are lower than what could have been 
achieved by maintaining the capital at an optimal level. So, for example, a 1999 government 
study indicated that U.S. landings were at that time about thirty to forty percent less than could 
be produced, on a continuing basis, by healthy fisheries. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., OUR LIVING OCEANS 8 (1999). 
Those fishermen who are active in the early, mining phase of a fishery will benefit finan-
cially from overfishing, but those who begin fishing after this period will not. Similarly, while 
consumers will benefit in the short-term from lower fish prices, over the long-term they will pay 
higher than needed prices and have fewer choices of affordable seafood. See generally SUZANNE 
IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING 
(1999). 
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vironment, as measured in terms of stability, productivity, and diver-
sity.4 Recent studies show that the number of endangered species is 
increasing,5 with long-term damage to ocean habitats,6 dramatic shifts 
in the structure of marine food webs,7 and a decrease in the capacity 
of fish populations to recover from historic overfishing.8 While the 
economic costs of these impacts are more difficult to measure than 
the direct costs of overfishing, there is reason to believe they are sig-
nificant.9 
To their credit, the commissions do not place the blame for these 
two problems entirely on the fishing industry.10 It is true that fishing is 
among the most significant factors in the decline of ocean ecosys-
tems.11 At the same time, fishing is a heavily regulated industry.12 The 
 
 4. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 32; PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 41-44. 
 5. J.A. Musick et al., Marine, Estuarine, and Diadromous Fish Stocks at Risk of Extinction 
in North America (Exclusive of Pacific Salmonids), 25 FISHERIES 6 (2000); Graeme C. Hays et 
al., Endangered Species: Pan-Atlantic Leatherback Turtle Movements, 429 NATURE 522 (2004). 
 6. Les Watling & Elliott A. Norse, Effects of Mobile Fishing Gear on Marine Benthos, 12 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1178 (1998); Les Watling & Elliott A. Norse, Disturbance of the Sea-
bed by Mobile Fishing Gear: A Comparison to Forest Clearcutting, 12 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 
1180 (1998). See generally LANCE E. MORGAN & RATANA CHUENPAGDEE, SHIFTING GEARS: 
ADDRESSING THE COLLATERAL IMPACTS OF FISHING METHODS IN U.S. WATERS (2003). 
 7. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., THE DECLINE OF THE STELLER SEA LION IN ALASKAN 
WATERS: UNTANGLING FOOD WEBS AND FISHING NETS (2003); Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing 
Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SCIENCE 860 (1998). 
 8. Jeffrey A. Hutchings & John D. Reynolds, Marine Fish Population Collapses: Conse-
quences for Recovery and Extinction Risk, 54 BIOSCIENCE 297 (2004); Jeremy B.C. Jackson et 
al., Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems, 293 SCIENCE 629 
(2001); Jeffrey A. Hutchings, Influence of Population Decline, Fishing, and Spawner Variability 
on the Recovery of Marine Fishes, 59 J. FISH BIOLOGY 306 (2001); Jeffrey A. Hutchings, Col-
lapse and Recovery of Marine Fishes, 406 NATURE 882 (2000). 
 9. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: 
CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS 480-81 (2005); see also Andrew Balmford et al., Economic Rea-
sons for Conserving Wild Nature, 297 SCIENCE 950 (2002); Robert Costanza et al., Principles for 
Sustainable Governance of the Oceans, 281 SCIENCE 198 (1998); Robert Costanza et al., The 
Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997). 
 10. It would be accurate to describe fishermen as the sole culprits in fishery collapse if the 
“commons” was unregulated. Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
(1968). However, American fisheries—and the great majority of fisheries in developed coun-
tries—can no longer accurately be described as commons. All substantial American fisheries are 
subject to extensive regulation and, generally speaking, new participants cannot freely enter. See 
generally MICHAEL L. WEBER, FROM ABUNDANCE TO SCARCITY: A HISTORY OF U.S. MARINE 
FISHERIES POLICY (2002). 
 11. Jackson et al., supra note 8. 
 12. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. Fisheries in American federal waters (three to 
two-hundred nautical miles from the coast) are regulated under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act by eight Regional Fishery Management Councils, operating 
under authority of the Secretary of Commerce. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act § 302, 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (2000) (States have jurisdiction from zero to three 
02__EAGLE.DOC 6/12/2006  11:04 AM 
146 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 16:143 
commissions thus recognize that the inadequacy of current institu-
tions plays an important role in persistent overfishing and in the gen-
eral deterioration of the United States’ marine environment.13 
Consistent with this conclusion, the commissions’ reports contain 
a range of suggestions aimed at legislatively or administratively im-
proving current management structures.14 In this paper, I critique one 
of the major recommendations common to both reports, that is, the 
call for “regional ocean governance.”15 Although each commission’s 
plan for implementing a regional approach is different, their ration-
ales and design concepts are quite similar: After explaining that pre-
sent institutions are too narrow in their geographic and substantive 
scope, the reports go on to advocate for the establishment of larger 
scale, more “comprehensive” management bodies.16 
Part II of the paper summarizes the commissions’ arguments for 
moving toward regional governance and their plans for reordering 
laws and institutions toward this end. I also highlight themes common 
to both commissions’ proposals. 
Part III of the paper argues that despite the intuitive appeal of 
“regional ecosystem councils,” the creation of more comprehensive 
institutions is unlikely to improve the condition of the marine envi-
ronment.17 While it is true that, due to free-riders and transaction 
costs, transboundary environmental problems can be more difficult to 
 
miles, although state action can in some cases be preempted by council action. Submerged 
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000); Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act § 306). The Regional Fishery Management Councils write detailed plans and rules govern-
ing fishing activities within their respective jurisdictions. See generally JOSH EAGLE ET AL., 
TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS (2003). 
 13. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-55; PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-28. For an 
empirical study of the mechanics of regulatory failure, see Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, 
Jr., Answering Lord Perry’s Question: Dissecting Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN & 
COASTAL MGMT. 649 (2003). See also Timothy Hennessey & Michael Healey, Ludwig’s Ratchet 
and the Collapse of New England Groundfish Stocks, 28 COASTAL MGMT. 187 (2000). 
 14. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 472-522; PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 102-16. 
 15. The chapters in the U.S. Commission’s report focusing on regional governance are 
Chapter Five, “Advancing a Regional Approach,” and Chapter Six, “Coordinating Manage-
ment in U.S. Waters.” USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 86-106. The relevant chapter in the 
Pew Commission’s report is Chapter Two, “Governance for Sustainable Seas.” PEW REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 26-34. Valuable information on the context of these recommendations can be 
gleaned from other chapters of the reports as well. 
 16. PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. The word “comprehensive” appears more than 200 
times in the U.S. Commission’s report, or about once every third page. 
 17. The U.S. Commission calls its councils “Regional Ocean Councils,” while the Pew 
Commission uses the term “Regional Ocean Ecosystem Councils.” USCOP REPORT, supra note 
1, at 90; PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 103. 
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solve than problems contained within a single political or administra-
tive division,18 there is evidence that current ocean institutions are 
struggling to solve even intrajurisdictional problems.19 Through the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act, for example, Congress has already delegated 
broad geographic and substantive regulatory authority to the eight 
Regional Fishery Management Councils (“FMCs”).20 Many, if not 
most, of the FMCs’ numerous  management failures have involved 
fisheries wholly within the bounds of a single council’s legal jurisdic-
tion.21 
Furthermore, to the extent that the proposed councils are 
charged with balancing more uses and interests than current institu-
tions, they will be less likely to achieve conservation goals. If one as-
sumes, as I argue below, that the poor condition of the marine envi-
ronment is in part a product of the multiple-use mandate under which 
agencies currently operate,22 then it follows that broadening the man-
date has the potential to exacerbate those problems. 
 
 18. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl et al., Proposal for a Model State Watershed Management Act, 33 
ENVTL. L. 929, 934-35 (2003); Alistair M. Ulph, Harmonization and Optimal Environmental 
Policy in a Federal System with Asymmetric Information, 39 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 224 
(2000); JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
(2004). 
 19. As an example of a major management failure, the Pew Report cites the demise of the 
once economically important West Coast rockfish (Sebastes genus) fisheries. PEW REPORT, su-
pra note 1, at 2. Fishing has reduced many of these species’ populations to the point where they 
can no longer support any catch whatsoever. LOVE ET AL., THE ROCKFISHES OF THE 
NORTHEAST PACIFIC 71-91 (2002). Throughout their lives, rockfish migrate very little; their 
management is an intrajurisdictional challenge. LOVE ET AL., supra, at 51-56. 
 20. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act § 302, 16 U.S.C. § 1852 
(2000). 
 21. For a complete listing of overfished U.S. fisheries, see NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 2. The vast majority of overfished fisheries are managed by 
a single FMC, although a few are managed jointly by two FMCs. Id. In cases where fish migrate 
through state and federal waters, but most of the fishing activity occurs in federal waters, the 
FMCs manage the fishery. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act § 
306, 16 U.S.C. § 1856 (2000). 
 22. The Magnuson-Stevens Act is a multiple-use, balancing statute. “National Standard 
One,” the first of ten national standards in the Act, for example, provides that “[c]onservation 
and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the 
optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry.” Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act § 301(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2000). At the 
same time, “National Standard Eight” states that: 
Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation re-
quirements of this Act (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of over-
fished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing com-
munities in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, 
and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such com-
munities. 
02__EAGLE.DOC 6/12/2006  11:04 AM 
148 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 16:143 
Part IV of the paper offers an alternate approach to ocean gov-
ernance—“agency diversity”—aimed at addressing the predictable 
failures of a multiple-use system. Under an agency diversity ap-
proach, multiple-use agencies are replaced by a set of “dominant-use” 
agencies.23 Instead of delegating one multiple-use agency jurisdiction 
over an area of ocean space, the legislature would divide that area 
into use-priority zones instead. Each use-priority zone would then be 
managed by an agency whose statutory mission is to manage and 
promote one particular use. So, for example, a recreational fishing 
agency would be charged with ensuring that its recreational fishing 
areas were managed primarily for the benefit of recreational fisher-
men. Thus divided, a map of the ocean would look more like a map of 
the public lands, separated into recreation, conservation, and com-
mercial areas, or of a city, divided into residential, commercial, and 
industrial zones.   
Following two strands of legal thinking, one on municipal zoning 
and the other on institutional diversity, I argue that an agency diver-
sity approach offers significant potential to improve marine conserva-
tion. Most obviously, it ensures that some parts of the ocean, that is, 
those parts entrusted by the legislature to dominant-use, conserva-
tion-first agencies, will actually be conserved.24 More important, it 
would have significant benefits for the system as a whole. By provid-
ing leverage to currently underrepresented interests, agency diversity 
opens the door to more productive negotiations over ocean uses.25 In 
 
Id. § 301(a)(8). 
In addition to requiring the managers and the Regional Fishery Management Councils to 
balance between conservation and the needs of the industry, the Magnuson-Stevens Act also 
mandates that the councils balance between the needs of various sectors of the fishing industry, 
such as commercial and recreational fishermen. Id. § 301(a)(4). 
 23. “Dominant-use” agencies are agencies that implement “dominant-use” statutes. A 
dominant-use statute is a law in which the legislature has given an agency explicit directions to 
presumptively or absolutely prioritize one use, or a small set of consistent uses, above all others. 
See Part III, infra. 
 24. For example, areas closed to fishing, known as marine reserves, provide significant eco-
logical benefits. See, e.g., T.R. McClanahan & B. Kaunda-Arara, Fishery Recovery in a Coral-
reef Marine Park and its Effect on the Adjacent Fishery, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1187 
(1996); J. Alder, Have Tropical Marine Protected Areas Worked? An Initial Analysis of their 
Success, 24 COASTAL MANAGEMENT 97-114 (1996); L. Wantiez et al., Effects of Marine Re-
serves on Coral Reef Fish Communities from Five Islands in New Caledonia, 16 CORAL REEFS 
215 (1997); S.J. Hall, Closed Areas for Fisheries Management—The Case Consolidates, 13 
TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 297 (1998). 
 25. Karkkainen explains how municipal zoning, through the spatial distribution of political 
power across the urban landscape, serves a similar function. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A 
Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45 (1994). “Rather than conceiving of zoning 
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the agency diversity paradigm, dominant-use agencies would serve as 
proxies in these negotiations for the various interests.26 It is in this 
context, as mediators in negotiations, that the regional governance in-
stitutions proposed by the U.S. and Pew Commissions could poten-
tially serve an important role. Agency diversity divides interests, clari-
fying and legitimizing perspectives and concerns, to help those 
interests conquer their differences.27 
The involvement of diverse agencies would produce better con-
servation results in a number of other ways. It would allow for the 
mitigation of risk through a portfolio of management strategies,28 the 
ability to experiment with those strategies, and the generation of 
more and better information on the impact of fishing on the marine 
environment.29 
Section IV ends with a discussion of some of the potential disad-
vantages of an agency diversity approach. For example, spatially 
fragmenting jurisdiction creates transaction costs that might inhibit 
the efficient management of cross-jurisdictional resources.30 In other 
words, there is a risk that agencies might not join together in collabo-
rative management. Anecdotal evidence from the public lands, how-
ever, suggests that agencies at least occasionally overcome these ob-
stacles to negotiation.31 
Section V concludes the paper. 
 
as consisting of legislative-type rules, we should understand zoning as establishing mere pre-
sumptions or baseline rules that precipitate and provide a convenient substantive starting point 
for negotiations between developers and representatives of neighborhood interests.” Id. at 81. 
See also Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Le-
gitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983); Eric H. Steele, Participation and Rules—The Functions of 
Zoning, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 709, 713 (1986) (“[I]n giving voice to the community’s inter-
ests and creating a forum in which the community’s will is empowered and can appropriately 
influence policy affecting its environment, zoning has the effect of fostering both the implicit 
strengthening of the bonds of community and explicit community organizing.”). 
 26. Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 81. 
 27. Put differently, agency diversity “tries to reduce the dangers of factionalism by disag-
gregating the polity.” Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 
1127 (2005). 
 28. See generally Harry M. Markowitz, Foundation of Portfolio Theory, 46 J. FIN. 469 
(1991). 
 29. See Gerken, supra note 27. 
 30. Ruhl et al., supra note 18, at 934-35; SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 18. 
 31. See Part IV, infra. 
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II.  THE COMMISSIONS’ VIEW OF GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS AND 
SOLUTIONS 
A. Problem One: Fractured-Use Jurisdiction 
Both commissions suggest that flaws in the current laws and insti-
tutions contribute to the poor environmental condition of the United 
States’ oceans.32 The reports highlight two structural problems. 
First, they note that the current regulatory regime is a frag-
mented “hodgepodge of individual laws”33 implemented by “sector-
based” agencies.34 The kernel of the “fractured use jurisdiction” prob-
lem is that within any given area of ocean space, multiple agencies act 
independently from one another in managing specific groups of re-
sources. For example, within the United States’ Exclusive Economic 
Zone,35 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 
(“NOAA”) Fisheries Service and the Regional Fishery Management 
Councils administer the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (fish);36 NOAA’s Office of Protected Resources ap-
plies the Marine Mammal Protection Act (marine mammals)37 and 
the Endangered Species Act (endangered fish, mammals, and sea-
birds);38 the Department of the Interior’s Minerals Management Ser-
vice implements the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (oil, gas, and 
seabed minerals);39 and the Environmental Protection Agency en-
forces the Clean Water Act (sea water).40 
 
 32. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-55; PEW REPORT, supra note 2, at 26-28. 
 33. PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 26. 
 34. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 86. 
 35. The concept of “Exclusive Economic Zones” originates in the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 55, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. These zones extend 200 nautical miles into ocean waters from the 
shores of coastal nations. Id. Under the Law of the Sea, coastal nations have certain rights and 
obligations in these waters, including the right to exclusive management authority over living 
marine resources. Id. art. 56. Although the United States is not a party to the Law of Sea treaty, 
it announced its claim to the equivalent of an Exclusive Economic Zone in 1976 in the original 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, and again in 1983 in a presidential proclamation 
issued by President Ronald Reagan. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act § 111, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000); Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983). 
 36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000). 
 37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (2000). 
 38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). 
 39. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000). 
 40. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
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The U.S. Commission explains in its report why fractured-use ju-
risdiction is an obstacle to successful resource management.41 
First, the involvement of multiple agencies renders public par-
ticipation difficult by increasing the costs to interested citizens.42 
Where there are multiple agencies with overlapping responsibilities, 
members of the public are uncertain about which agencies they 
should contact regarding particular issues and which agencies should 
be held accountable for failures.43 More agency processes translate to 
less pro rata participation: Members of the public are limited, by time 
or other resource constraints, in the number of regulatory processes 
in which they can participate.44 While it is important in all contexts, 
robust public participation is crucial to successful natural resource 
management because resource owners’ incentives are consistent with 
long-term sustainability.45 
Second, when agencies themselves are not clear as to their re-
sponsibilities, the resource suffers.46 Regulatory uncertainty causes 
delays while agencies decide whether or not to act, and it eliminates 
important institutional incentives.47 The greater the number of re-
sponsible agencies, the easier it is for any one agency to deflect blame 
for conservation failures.48 
Third, under the current system, no single agency is able to plan 
comprehensively. For example, the fisheries agency will have to plan 
the future location of fishing activities without knowing, or being able 
to control, the future location of oil drilling operations. Put differ-
ently, there is no mechanism for ensuring that particular places in the 
ocean are put to their most efficient use. 
Finally, fractured-use jurisdiction leads to complex and opaque 
governance with multiple agencies regulating activities in the same 
 
 41. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 86. 
 42. Wendy E. Wagner, Restoring Polluted Waters with Public Values, 25 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 451-58 (2000); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regula-
tory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 412, 423 (2005). 
 43. Wagner, supra note 42. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Section IV, infra. 
 46. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory 
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 47. Id. at 30-36. For an example of the effects of overlapping agency jurisdiction on regula-
tion, see James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the 
FCC and the Justice Department Over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 COMM. L. 
CONSPECTUS 101 (1998). 
 48. Buzbee, supra note 46. 
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area.49 Complexity and opacity have a deleterious effect on compli-
ance by the regulated communities. Complicated rules are obviously 
more difficult to follow than simple ones.50 Furthermore, the percep-
tion that rules are complex and opaque can potentially serve as a ra-
tionalization for noncompliance.51  Both unintentional and intentional 
noncompliance undermine the ultimate success of resource conserva-
tion efforts.52 
B. Problem Two: Fractured-Authority 
The second problem with the current system, according to the 
commissions, is that sovereign and administrative jurisdictions do not 
correspond to the boundaries of marine ecosystems, especially when 
those systems are defined to include coastal watersheds. The U.S. 
Commission explains: 
The current political . . . delineation of jurisdictional boundaries 
makes it difficult to address complex issues that affect many parts 
of the ecosystem. Economic development in a coastal area may fall 
under the jurisdiction of several local governments, and natural re-
source management under the jurisdiction of one or more 
states . . . . Yet water, people, fish, marine mammals, and ships flow 
continually across these invisible institutional borders.53 
As a result of the “fractured authority” or “mismatched scales” 
problem, no one state or federal agency has the power to comprehen-
sively manage resources that migrate across boundaries. This problem 
is not limited to the marine environment. Scholars of environmental 
policy have long recognized that the involvement of multiple jurisdic-
tions in governing parts or pieces of an environmental issue is prob-
lematic.54 Each additional jurisdiction adds to negotiation costs, re-
ducing the possibility of efficacious resolution.55 Furthermore, the 
involvement of more than one jurisdiction creates the opportunity 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory 
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slip-
page Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999). 
 51. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 50. 
 52. Id.; see also Eagle & Thompson, supra note 13. 
 53. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. See also Hanna J. Cortner et al., Institutions Mat-
ter: The Need to Address the Institutional Challenges of Ecosystem Management, 40 LANDSCAPE 
& URB. PLANNING 159, 162 (1998). 
 54. Ruhl et al., supra note 18, at 934-35; SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 18. 
 55. See generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & LEE ROSS, BARRIERS TO CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION (1999). 
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and incentive for each jurisdiction to free-ride on the benefits of pre-
scriptions applied by another.56 
Salmon management in the Pacific Northwest provides a good 
example of the sheer number of jurisdictions that can be implicated in 
the conservation of a marine natural resource. In the Columbia River 
basin alone, the United States and Canadian governments, five states 
(Montana, Idaho, Washington, Nevada, and Oregon), two Canadian 
provinces (British Columbia and Alberta), numerous tribal authori-
ties, and dozens of local governments each have the authority to regu-
late activities that affect the well-being of salmon populations.57 Ac-
cording to the Pew Commission: 
The fragmentation of responsibility for planning, funding, and im-
plementing; the failure to establish firm restoration goals; the lack 
of legal and institutional mechanisms to ensure that restoration 
goals are achieved; and the failure to bring all relevant parties to 
the negotiating table have been major obstacles to salmon restora-
tion in the Columbia River Basin.58 
C. The U.S. Commission’s Proposal 
In its report, the U.S. Commission elaborates on its vision of op-
timal ocean governance in the future. This is governance that is com-
prehensive, integrated, and holistic: 
Management boundaries correspond with ecosystem regions, and 
policies consider interactions among all ecosystem components. In 
the face of scientific uncertainty, managers balance competing con-
siderations and proceed with caution. Ocean governance is effec-
tive, participatory, and well coordinated among government agen-
cies, the private sector, and the public.59 
In the commission’s view, the best vehicles for moving toward its 
conception of optimal governance are what it calls “Regional Ocean 
Councils.”60 Councils would be formed on a voluntary basis by states 
and other governmental authorities concerned about marine conser-
vation problems that transcend their individual jurisdictional realms. 
Each council would be formed according to some basic design princi-
ples. First, it should be “scale-matched” to the problem or problems it 
 
 56. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote In-
novation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 605, 605-06 (1980). 
 57. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., MANAGING THE COLUMBIA RIVER: INSTREAM FLOWS, 
WATER WITHDRAWALS, AND SALMON SURVIVAL (2004). 
 58. PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. 
 59. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. 
 60. Id. at 90. 
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is set up to address: Its “boundaries should be based approximately 
on [a] Large Marine Ecosystem61 or other appropriate ecosystem-
based area.”62 The boundary of each regional council should “encom-
pass the area from the inland extent of coastal watersheds to the off-
shore boundary of the nation’s exclusive economic zone.”63 Each 
council should be set up as a broad, multiple-use agency: It “should 
address a wide range of ocean and coastal issues”64 and manage by 
balancing “competing considerations.”65 
Membership on the U.S. Commission’s regional ocean councils is 
meant to help mitigate the fractured-authority problem. Seats on each 
council would be held by representatives of governments with author-
ity over resource management within the council’s boundaries, in-
cluding states and local governments.66 Nongovernmental stake-
holders, such as fishermen and environmentalists, would serve on 
advisory subcommittees.67 
The U.S. Commission emphasizes that the regional councils 
would not have a regulatory function: 
The regional ocean councils are not intended to supplant any exist-
ing authorities, such as the [Regional Fishery Management Coun-
cils],68 state agencies, and tribal governments. Rather, the councils 
will work with these authorities to further regional goals, providing 
a mechanism for coordination on myriad regional issues.69 
At the same time, the U.S. Commission’s ideal appears to be that 
regional councils would serve as the engine for more comprehensive 
management, where the number of agencies and jurisdictions in-
volved is effectively reduced through collaboration and the develop-
 
 61.  The USCOP report provides:   
Since the 1960s, scientists have developed and refined the concept of “large marine 
ecosystems,” (“LMEs”). These regions divide the ocean into large functional units 
based on shared bathymetry, hydrography, productivity, and populations. LMEs en-
compass areas from river basins and estuaries to the outer edges of continental shelves 
and seaward margins of coastal current systems. 
Id. at 63. 
 62. Id. at 86. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 4. 
 66. Id. at 86. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 69. USCOP REPORT, supra note 1, at 90. 
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ment of joint management programs.70 The U.S. Commission refers to 
the ultimate goal of “strong coordination” and “a more comprehen-
sive governance structure” for the management of shared resources.71 
While the U.S. commission walks lightly around the politically 
sensitive issue of creating a new “superagency” with authority to 
trump participating jurisdictions, the commission’s proposal would 
make very little sense if the ultimate objective were not some form of 
joint management. There would be some value in simply sharing in-
formation or in creating a discussion forum; however, neither of these 
council “products” would likely merit the costs of creating, organiz-
ing, and running the councils. More important, neither information 
sharing nor discussion would by themselves solve the fractured-use 
and authority problems the commissions identify as obstacles to suc-
cessful management. While there is a benefit to reducing the transac-
tion costs of negotiations, the only logical reason for reducing costs is 
to facilitate a negotiated agreement. 
If we accept the creation of such agreements as an essential 
council function, the U.S. Commission’s proposed solution is one that 
directly addresses both the fractured-use and fractured-authority 
problems. The councils are seen to be a means, albeit a “soft” means, 
for achieving “multiple-use, ecosystem-based” management:72 
These regional ocean councils would . . . serve as focal points for 
discussion, cooperation, and coordination. They would improve the 
nation’s ability to respond to issues that cross jurisdictional 
boundaries and would help policy makers address the large-scale 
 
 70. Evidence of this commission’s desire for “institutional melding” can be found in the 
guiding principles set out in a section of the commission’s report entitled “Setting the Nation’s 
Sights”: 
Ecosystem-based Management: U.S. ocean and coastal resources should be managed 
to reflect the relationships among all ecosystem components, including humans and 
nonhuman species and the environments in which they live. Applying this principle 
will require defining relevant geographic management areas based on ecosystem, rather 
than political, boundaries. 
Multiple Use Management: The many potentially beneficial uses of ocean and coastal 
resources should be acknowledged and managed in a way that balances competing uses 
while preserving and protecting the overall integrity of the ocean and coastal environ-
ments. 
Understandable Laws and Clear Decisions: Laws governing uses of ocean and coastal 
resources should be clear, coordinated, and accessible to the nation’s citizens to facili-
tate compliance. Policy decisions and the reasoning behind them should also be clear 
and available to all interested parties. 
Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. at 9. 
 72. Id. at 10. 
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connections and conflicts among watershed, coastal, and offshore 
uses.73 
D. The Pew Commission’s Proposal 
The Pew Commission also recommends a move toward compre-
hensive, scale-matched, regional ocean governance.74 Unlike the U.S. 
Commission’s councils (“U.S. Councils”), which would be formed 
voluntarily from the bottom up, under the Pew Commission’s propos-
als, Congress would create the “Regional Ocean Ecosystem Coun-
cils” (“Pew Councils”) through new federal legislation.75 In this stat-
ute, which the Pew Commission calls the National Ocean Policy Act 
(“NOPA”), Congress would establish jurisdictional boundaries for 
each council, roughly based on the existing boundaries of the Re-
gional Fishery Management Councils created by the Magnuson-
Stevens Act.76 
As in the case of the U.S. Councils, membership on each Pew 
Council would consist of “federal, state, and tribal authorities with ju-
risdiction over ocean space and resources in a region.”77 Stakeholders, 
such as fishermen and environmentalists, would provide input to deci-
sion processes through “a robust and influential advisory process.”78 
The Pew Councils would have more inherent power than the 
U.S. Councils. According to the commission’s report: 
These councils should be charged with developing and overseeing 
implementation of enforceable regional ocean governance plans to 
carry out the national policy to protect, maintain, and restore ma-
rine ecosystems. To be enforceable, plans must include perform-
ance goals and indicators, [and] must be binding on all parties.79 
However, like the U.S. Commission’s plan, the Pew Commis-
sion’s plan would not eliminate existing federal sector-based agen-
cies:80 NOPA would require that agency actions be consistent with 
 
 73. Id. at 8. 
 74. See generally PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-34. 
 75. Id. at 33. 
 76. Id. at 103. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 33. 
 80. “Regional ocean councils should leave day-to-day management to the appropriate au-
thorities. For example, federal fisheries management would remain the purview of the National 
Marine Fisheries Service [NOAA Fisheries] and the appropriate regional fishery management 
council.” Id. at 104. 
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councils’ regional ocean governance plans.81 To minimize fractured-
authority problems, NOPA would provide a range of incentives for 
state governments to conform their management actions to council 
plans.82 Modeled on the Coastal Zone Management Act,83 NOPA’s 
“carrots” would include both cash grants and the right to object to 
federal actions outside state jurisdiction.84 
While the mechanism employed is slightly different, the Pew 
Councils are meant to serve the same role as the U.S. Councils: effec-
tively reducing the number of agencies and jurisdictions that can 
make decisions regarding the use of marine natural resources. 
III.  THE PERILS OF MULTIPLE-USE MANAGEMENT 
The shift that both commissions want to make toward scale-
matched, multiple-use institutions has rational bases. 
First, comprehensive regional councils would function as “lead 
agencies,” exercising jurisdiction over all resource uses within a de-
fined ocean space. The simplified governance structure would en-
hance opportunities for public participation, improve regulatory 
compliance, and improve managers’ incentives. Streamlined govern-
ance would reduce the costs of—and  thus increase the opportunities 
for—public participation. The overall number of decision-making loci 
would be reduced, and interested citizens could more easily identify 
the appropriate place for participation.85 Simpler rules and more 
transparent rulemaking processes represent critical steps toward im-
proved compliance.86 Finally, a sole agency, clearly in charge of man-
aging “its” marine resources, should have fewer incentives to avoid or 
delay action and to “pass the buck” for failed management.87 
The second rationale supporting the use of scale-matched, multi-
ple-use institutions is that they better reflect the true nature of the 
marine environment, and in particular the interrelationships between 
 
 81. Id. at 105. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000). 
 84. PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 105. Under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 
states can object to proposed activities in federal waters that are not “consistent to the maxi-
mum extent practicable with” coastal management plans that those states have developed for 
activities in state waters. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A). 
 85. Wagner, supra note 42. 
 86. Farber, supra note 50, at 320-21. 
 87. Buzbee, supra note 46. 
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its component parts.88 Thus, decisions can take into account impacts 
that are diverse, both in terms of where and how they occur. If, for 
example, an agency is charged with managing a migratory fish species, 
it makes sense to give that agency the power to regulate all of the 
many activities that affect the species throughout its life history, in-
cluding fishing, pollution, offshore oil and gas drilling, etc., regardless 
of where they occur.89 
A. Problems With Balancing 
While appealing, these rationales fail to take into account the 
practical problems associated with balancing varied uses of natural 
resources. Agency balancing is a flawed concept for several reasons. 
First, many resource uses are truly incompatible and thus cannot be 
“balanced,” in the common sense of the word. For example, it is im-
possible for a backcountry hiker to enjoy a wilderness experience in 
the middle of a forest clear-cut. An agency can “balance” these tim-
ber harvest and recreation uses only by distributing them across 
space, if available, or over time, given a long enough horizon.90 In nei-
ther of those solutions is use of the specific resource, the clear-cut 
area itself, balanced. The particular parcel of land is razed, or not. 
This is a zero-sum game. 
Other examples are more subtle. For instance, the principal goal 
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act is to keep fish populations at a level 
that produces the “maximum sustainable yield.”91 Scientists are not 
certain, though, about the population level where this “optimal re-
production” is achieved. Some biologists think it is in the neighbor-
hood of forty percent of the pre-fishing population, while others think 
it is closer to seventy-five percent.92 If conservation groups advocate 
for the latter definition, while the fishing industry prefers the former, 
and the scientific evidence is equivocal, how can “use” of a particular 
fish population be balanced? Does a goal of fifty-seven percent repre-
sent multiple-use management? 
 
 88. Cortner et al., supra note 53, at 161. 
 89. See Farber, supra note 50, at 317. 
 90. Jeffrey R. Vincent & Clark S. Binkley, Efficient Multiple-Use Forestry May Require 
Land-Use Specialization, 69 LAND ECON. 370 (1993). 
 91. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act § 301(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 
1851(a)(1) (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 1802(28). 
 92. See, e.g., William G. Clark, Groundfish Exploitation Rates Based On Life History Pa-
rameters, 48 CAN. J. AQUATIC SCI. 734 (1991) (twenty to sixty percent); Joan Roughgarden, 
How to Manage Fisheries, 8 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 160 (1998) (seventy-five percent). 
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This last example highlights a second problem in multiple-use 
balancing. When information is uncertain, or when user groups have 
widely disparate views of how the resource ought to be used, agencies 
will naturally tend toward Solomonic averaging. Splitting the differ-
ence is “fair” only in an arbitrary way. A finding that fifty-seven per-
cent of an unfished population produces the maximum sustainable 
yield is not based on science, nor does it represent a reasoned attempt 
to achieve equity. Averaging, however, presents even bigger prob-
lems. Where users are in conflict across an entire landscape or sea-
scape, averaging leads to the uniform application of middle-of-the-
road management strategies.  
In the world of fisheries management, there is no better example 
of this than the case of Natural Resources Defense Council v. Daley.93 
In that case, the court decided a dispute between environmentalists 
and the fishing industry, ultimately interpreting the language, “man-
agement measures . . . shall prevent overfishing,” to mean “manage-
ment measures shall have at least a fifty-one percent chance of pre-
venting overfishing.”94 Although environmental groups considered 
this a “win,” given that the agency had earlier found an eighteen per-
cent chance acceptable, it still left the success of U.S. fisheries man-
agement to a slightly weighted coin toss.95 In this context, averaging 
provides an incentive for interest groups to seek scientific opinions 
further away from the mean, further polarizing debate: The testimony 
of a scientist who believes that a population produces maximum yield 
at thirty-seven percent of its unfished level could be worth millions of 
dollars. 
 
 93. 209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 94. The court found that: 
[T]he adopted quota guaranteed only an 18% probability of achieving the principal 
conservation goal of the summer flounder fishery management plan. The Service of-
fered neither analysis nor data to support its claim that the two additional measures 
aside from the quota would increase that assurance beyond the at-least-50% likelihood 
required by statute and regulation. 
Id. at 756. The “at-least-50%” requirement is implied by the court. The words are not in the 
Act. 
 95. In a 2000 online newsletter, the Pacific Marine Conservation Council claimed that “[a] 
recent decision by the US Court of Appeals (DC Circuit) . . . sets important precedents.” 
Victory for an Atlantic Flounder has Implications out West, PMCC Q. (Pac. Marine Conservation 
Council, Arcata, Cal.), Aug. 2000, at 4, available at  http://www.pmcc.org/newsletters/newsletter 
august.htm. 
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For diffuse, politically weak groups of users, averaging actually 
represents a best-case scenario.96 It will often be the case that an 
agency’s final decision is closer to the result advocated by the 
stronger, more concentrated interests. Strong groups will not only be 
able to afford “better” experts, but they will participate in agency de-
cision-making processes with more frequency and intensity than weak 
groups.97 One does not have to believe in agency capture theory98 to 
be convinced that because of their enhanced participation, strong 
groups will, on average, have more influence on agency decisions than 
their adversaries.99 
Take, for example, a decision about whether or not to permit the 
fishing industry to use a certain kinds of hooks to catch swordfish. As-
sume that these hooks, called “X” hooks, represent the most efficient 
 
 96. For an introduction to theories of concentrated and diffuse, or “latent” groups, see 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ch. 1 (1971). Schroeder provides a good 
summary of Olson’s theories: 
Arguing that most people would approach the decision to contribute or not by weigh-
ing the costs and benefits, Olson predicted that groups would be hard to organize when 
the group activity promised to produce benefits that were spread out among benefici-
aries in amounts that are small compared to the costs of securing them. Each individ-
ual would see that her contribution to the group effort was not going to affect her own 
personal fortunes—either others would contribute enough so that she could free-ride 
on their efforts or others would not contribute and the minimal amount she was willing 
to contribute would not put the effort over the top. In either case, no benefits to her 
would be produced by her contribution, and hence it would be irrational to join in the 
group effort. 
Groups whose benefits were diffuse in this sense were labeled “latent” groups by Ol-
son because the shared group benefit was likely to remain unrealized. In contrast, 
groups that contain members with more concentrated benefits would be more likely to 
organize, either because a single member has enough at stake in the benefit to under-
write individually the costs of securing the group benefit, or because a subgroup of 
members within the larger group is small enough so that they can effectively agree to 
pool sufficient resources to produce the benefit. Compared to latent groups, such 
groups as these have a comparative advantage with respect to their ability to organize 
to advance group interests. 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment—Explanations for Envi-
ronmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 33-34 (1998). Schroeder also pro-
vides a good synopsis of criticism of Olson’s theories. 
 97. OLSON, supra note 96. 
 98. “Agency capture” theory suggests that a regulatory agency can be commandeered by 
the regulated community to serve its own purposes. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING 
BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955). 
 99. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY 264 (1983) 
(“Notwithstanding the many changes in the structure and political environment of the bureauc-
racy, the energy agencies cooperated most with interest groups that had the expert personnel 
and the financial resources to contribute to these slow and technical policymaking processes.”); 
Scott R. Furlong, Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The Bureaucracy Speaks, 8 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 39 (1998); Scott R. Furlong, Interest Group Influence on Rule Making, 
29 ADMIN. & SOC. 213 (1997); MICHAEL D. REAGAN, THE POLITICS OF POLICY (1987); BARRY 
M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION (1980). 
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method of catching swordfish in terms of catch per unit of effort. 
Compared to the next most efficient technique, using what are called 
“Y” hooks, X hooks earn each fisherman an additional $5,000 per 
year. Assume that X hooks result in very high levels of sea turtle “by-
catch,” and that sea turtles are very rare. Compared to Y hooks, the 
X hooks catch—that is, cost—$5 million worth of additional turtles 
each year.100 
If there were only 100 fishermen fishing per swordfish, the ra-
tional decision would be to prefer Y hooks over X hooks. The choice 
of Y hooks would result in a net gain to society of $4.5 million. Be-
cause the per-individual benefits of using X hooks are higher than the 
costs of attending hearings or writing comments, fishermen will have 
strong incentives to participate in agency decision-making processes. 
On the other hand, since the potential loss of $4.5 million is distrib-
uted across society, members of the general public are less likely to 
become involved.101 
In the above example, the agency has rational—even superfi-
cially legitimate—reasons to permit X hooks to be used, even where 
the result is inefficient. As the “most interested” constituents, fisher-
men are the members of the public most likely to contact an agency’s 
supervisors, that is, legislators, when they are unhappy with agency 
decisions.102 Furthermore, an agency choosing to permit the use of X 
hooks can easily see itself as simply making a democratic decision: 
More of its constituents “voted,” through the legitimate mechanism 
of participation, for X hooks than Y hooks.103 
Empirical findings support the conclusion that this mechanism is 
operative, at least some of the time, in fisheries decision-making. In 
an earlier paper, Thompson and I examined decisions made by Re-
gional Fishery Management Councils over a twenty-five year pe-
riod.104 In one of the fisheries we studied, scientists presented their 
advice on annual catch levels to the councils in the form of a range. 
 
 100. Without an actual market for endangered sea turtles, it is impossible to place an actual 
dollar value on the cost of taking each additional animal. Economists have developed a number 
of methods for measuring the value of these non-market commodities, most notably, “contin-
gent valuation.” See, e.g., John B. Loomis & D.S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and Endan-
gered Species: Summary and Meta-analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL. ECON. 197 (1996). While the 
amount may be difficult to determine, there is no question that they meet the criteria for having 
economic value: they are limited in quantity, and people enjoy them. 
 101. OLSON, supra note 96. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Eagle & Thompson, supra note 13. 
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Setting catch levels at the high end of the range meant choosing a 
high risk of overfishing and a low risk of unnecessarily depriving fish-
ermen of revenue; setting catches at the low end meant the opposite. 
For obvious reasons, the fishing industry would prefer high catches, 
while conservationists would prefer a more cautious approach. Our 
data showed that the councils consistently chose to set catch levels 
above the mean of the range. Only once in fifteen years did the coun-
cil choose a quota below the mean, while it chose quotas at or above 
the top end of the range six times.105 This phenomenon has been docu-
mented in other fisheries as well.106 
B. Special Problems of Marine Conservation 
As Olson pointed out, the concentrated-diffuse dynamic is not 
unique to environmental issues; it exists in many regulatory conflicts. 
In the context of marine conservation, however, there are two reasons 
why it is especially problematic. First, marine conservation as a politi-
cal interest is particularly weak, thus exaggerating the influence of the 
fishing industry.107 Second, the concentrated-diffuse dynamic has 
tragic results, not just for the conservation groups who regularly lose 
in agency-sponsored balancing contests, but for the long-term health 
of the marine environment. 
The weakness of marine conservation as a political interest de-
rives from the fact that humans are a terrestrial species: It is difficult 
for us to interact with those parts of the ocean that lay beyond the 
 
 105. Id. at 657. 
 106. See, e.g., CARL SAFINA, SONG FOR THE BLUE OCEAN 7-116 (1997); Hennessey & 
Healey, supra note 13. 
 107. In some regions of the country, other groups feel disenfranchised within the multiple-
use process. Recreational fishermen, for example, perceive that their voices are often swamped 
by those of commercial fishermen. A recent story in the St. Petersburg Times illustrates: 
After months of debate and controversy, hundreds of thousands of recreational anglers 
will learn Wednesday when they can once again fish for red grouper in the Gulf of 
Mexico. But the story behind this historic meeting of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Man-
agement Council is about much more than a cheap fish sandwich. It is a tale of power, 
money and old school politics. Since 1994, when Floridians voted overwhelmingly to 
ban nets from state waters, commercial fishermen and recreational anglers have bat-
tled for public opinion. The billion-dollar commercial industry says sport fishermen are 
nibbling away at their piece of the pie. But the $5-billion recreational sector, which 
thanks to the Internet is better organized than ever, says commercial fishermen are 
depleting fish stocks for generations to come. The federal government, charged with 
protecting the resource, now finds itself with the unenviable task of mediating between 
two warring factions. “We question the federal government’s numbers,” said Dennis 
O’Hern, spokesman for the Fishing Rights Alliance. “We also suspect [federal fishery 
managers] too often make decisions to benefit the [commercial] industry.” 
Terry Tomalin, Great Grouper Debate Near End?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at 
1B. 
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low-tide line.108 From the vantage point of the beach, the sea looks the 
same whether teeming with fish or not.109 The physical inaccessibility 
of the ocean means that it is difficult for members of the public to de-
velop any kind of emotional connection with marine wildlife.110 This, 
in turn, reduces public interest in enhanced levels of marine conserva-
tion.111 
Physical separation from the oceans, though, does more than di-
minish individuals’ interest in participating in regulatory processes. It 
means that marine conservation, as a political movement, lacks natu-
ral, economically powerful political allies.112 Compare the example of 
 
 108. The average depth of the world’s oceans is about two and a half miles. ELLEN J. 
PRAGER & SYLVIA A. EARLE, THE OCEANS 90 (2000). The world depth record for scuba diving 
is less than one-quarter of a mile. Matthew Beard, British Scuba Diver Sets New World Record 
with Depth of 313 Metres, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Dec. 22, 2003, at 7. 
 109. According to some early accounts, it may have once been the case that abundant ma-
rine life could be easily detected from the beach or the ocean’s surface. Early explorers reported 
from Newfoundland, for example, that “the sea is covered with fish which are caught not merely 
with nets but with baskets, a stone being attached to make the baskets sink with the water.” 
W.H. Lear, History of Fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic: The 500-Year Perspective, 23 J. NW. 
ATLANTIC FISHERY SCI. 41, 44 (1998) (quoting the explorer John Cabot). 
 110. As author and ocean advocate Carl Safina has noted: 
People have [an] intimate relationship with birds because you can hang a bird feeder 
out the window and you can admire birds. But you can’t put a fish feeder outside your 
window and admire fish. You have no relationship with them. You see them only as a 
slab of meat. It’s as though our whole relationship with birds was the experience of be-
ing in the poultry section of the supermarket. 
Bill Moyers Reports: Earth on Edge (PBS television broadcast June 19, 2001). A transcript of 
the Carl Safina interview is available at http://www.pbs.org/earthonedge/program/safina2.html. 
See also Tatiana Brailovskaya, Obstacles to Protecting Marine Biodiversity through Marine Wil-
derness Preservation: Examples from the New England Region, 12 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 
1235 (1998). There have been efforts to determine the economic value individuals put on the 
simple existence of wildlife. Loomis & White, supra note 100. I have not been able to find even 
one study, however, where an economist attempted to determine if there is existence value in 
marine fish species. 
 111. When asked, “Which of the following do you think is the most important environ-
mental problem facing this country?”, only five percent of survey respondents named the ocean, 
while about one percent identified threats to coastal habitats. Vikki N. Spruill, U.S. Public Atti-
tudes Toward Marine Environmental Issues, 10 OCEANOGRAPHY 149 (1997). More telling, only 
ten percent replied that they would be “almost certain to attend council or state legislative 
meetings on ocean issues.” Id. at 151. 
 112. Some scholars have attempted to explain accomplishments of the environmental 
movement with what is known as the “Baptist-bootlegger” theory: While environmentalists 
provide a moral rationale for protecting the environment, the probabilities of their political suc-
cess are enhanced when the cause is also supported by those who stand to gain financially from 
protective measures. Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warm-
ing Battle, 26 HARV. ENTL. L. REV. 177 (2002). Thus, for example, companies with large private-
land timber holdings might support environmental laws restricting timber harvest on public 
land. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 REGULATION 5 (1999). While 
Yandle appears to regard the phenomenon as an undesirable distortion of the political process, 
02__EAGLE.DOC 6/12/2006  11:04 AM 
164 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 16:143 
conservation on the public lands. The most conservation-friendly ar-
eas on the public lands are Wilderness Areas, the National Parks, and 
the National Wildlife Refuges.113 Although environmental groups par-
ticipated in lobbying Congress to establish these places, they were 
greatly aided in their efforts by powerful economic interests: the tour-
ism industry and sporting goods manufacturers.114 There are no analo-
gous “umbrella” interests providing economic cover to marine con-
servation groups in the political process. There are more archers in 
America than scuba divers.115 
Why does it matter that the fishing industry frequently wins mul-
tiple-use balancing contests? To answer this question, it is important 
to understand the role that a marine resources agency ideally ought to 
play in managing the commons. Hardin explained how the lack of 
well-defined property rights leads to inefficient use of commons re-
sources,116 and argued that efficiency could be achieved through pri-
vate or public ownership of the resource.117 Historically, governments 
 
he also recognizes its value in explaining or predicting legislative outcomes. Yandle & Buck, 
supra, at 7. 
 113. These lands are governed, respectively, under the provisions of the Wilderness Act of 
1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2000), the National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000), and 
the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2000). 
 114. RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS 24 (1984); 
see ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 173 (University of Ne-
braska Press 1997) (1979); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND 
WILDLIFE SERVICE, RESTORING AMERICA’S WILDLIFE 1937-1987 1-16 (1987). 
 115. There are an estimated 2.3 million scuba divers in the United States, making it compa-
rable in popularity to sports such as cross-country skiing. Professional Association of Diving 
Instructors, PADI Statistics, http://www.padi.com/english/common/padi/statistics/6.asp (last vis-
ited Dec. 1, 2005); by comparison, there are an estimated fifty-five million campers, thirty mil-
lion hikers, nineteen million hunters, and thirty-eight million freshwater fishermen. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005, at 774 (2005). 
While recreational saltwater fishing is a popular activity (twelve million people reported 
fishing once during 2002, id.), the recreational fishing industry has not historically supported the 
agenda of marine conservation groups. Language on the website for the Recreational Fishing 
Alliance, one of the largest saltwater sportfishing groups in the United States, is typical: 
You can join the RFA and fight back, or you could just let the government, the indus-
trial fishing fleets, environmentalists and the politicians decide for you. That is what 
most of us recreational anglers did in years past and they walked all over us. 
Recreational Fishing Alliance, Join the RFA, http://www.joinrfa.org/join.asp (last visited Feb. 
14, 2005). 
 116. Hardin, supra note 10, at 1244. Simply put, commons users have no incentive to sacri-
fice short-term gain for greater long-term benefit. While it might make sense, for example, to 
allow a fish to reproduce before catching it, the commons user will rationally choose not to wait: 
without a legally recognized right to the progeny, she has no assurance that she will have the 
opportunity to catch them. 
 117. Hardin, supra note 10, at 1245. See also PHILIP A. NEHER, NATURAL RESOURCE 
ECONOMICS: CONSERVATION AND EXPLOITATION 256 (1990). 
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have eschewed private ownership, opting almost exclusively for pub-
lic ownership of fisheries: a “regulated commons.”118 Whether an 
owner succeeds in the goal of optimal management depends in large 
part on accurate information regarding the resource and its current 
and future value.119 Successful management of a publicly owned, 
“regulated commons” further depends on the willingness of the man-
aging agency to resist pressure from commons users, who often con-
tinue to have the same incentives as they had prior to the com-
mencement of regulation.120 If agencies do not resist, their decisions 
will differ dramatically, to the detriment of the long-term health of 
the resource, from choices that a private owner would make. The net 
result is a regulated system that mirrors the unregulated system: in 
other words, a “tragedy of the regulated commons.”121 
 
The common pool problem begins with the simple idea that the efficient intertemporal 
allocation of resources requires that any decision on the current rate of use takes into 
account the entailments for future supplies. A “sole owner” (controller) of a resource 
who has perpetual tenure is motivated to do just that. He must live with the future 
consequences of his own current decisions. . . . There is no reason in principal why a 
state planning authority cannot mimic the responsible behavior of a privately moti-
vated sole owner. 
Id. 
It should be noted that there is a line of scholarship questioning the need for sole ownership, 
arguing that communities, in particular cases, can organize to successfully manage common re-
sources collectively. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION 
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). One can easily make the case, however, 
that “community-based” management is simply a third form of sole ownership. 
 118. Two countries, Iceland and New Zealand, have implemented extensive “individual 
quota” programs that effectively privatize the total allowable catch of fish by dividing it into 
shares. Newell et al., Fishing Quota Markets, 49 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 437 (2005). Fisher-
men can buy and sell these quota shares, subject to some restrictions. Id. There are only a few 
individual quota programs in use in the United States. See Katrina M. Wyman, From Fur to 
Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005). 
 119. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing The 
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241 (2000). 
 120. Fishermen’s incentives remain the same because of the management tools chosen by 
regulators. The most common tool used to manage American fisheries is the annual limit on 
total catch, or “quota.” Under an annual quota system, regulators set a cap on the amount of 
fish that can be caught each year. Fishermen compete with each other to catch these fish until 
the quota has been met, perpetually investing in better equipment to give themselves an advan-
tage over others. Leonard J. Mirman & Daniel F. Spurber, Fishery Regulation with Harvest Un-
certainty, 26 INT’L. ECON. REV. 731 (1985); James A. Crutchfield, An Economic Evaluation of 
Alternative Methods of Fisheries Regulation, 4 LAW & ECON. 131 (1961). 
 121. David Dana refers to this phenomenon as “the tragedy of the political commons.” 
David A. Dana, Overcoming the Political Tragedy of the Commons: Lessons Learned from the 
Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833 (1997). Empirical evidence sup-
ports the hypothesis that current institutions are susceptible to this mechanism: The symptoms 
described by the two commissions (for example, overfishing) are identical to symptoms of the 
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IV.  HOW AGENCY DIVERSITY CAN OPTIMIZE MARINE 
CONSERVATION 
Why might use of an agency-diversity model avoid the conserva-
tion problems that arise from multiple-use balancing? In considering 
this question, it is useful to take a step back and examine the options 
available to legislators in designing laws for managing the use of natu-
ral resources. On one hand, legislators wishing to exercise some con-
trol over disposition of a resource can opt for a multiple-use statute.122 
Such statutes give resource-management agencies unlimited discre-
tion in allocating resources among user groups.123 For example, under 
a multiple-use law, the agency would have unfettered power to de-
termine whether the catches in a fishery should be allocated to com-
mercial fishermen or recreational fishermen.124 On the other hand, 
legislators can choose to adopt a dominant-use law.125 These laws give 
agencies specific directions in ordering the priority of allocations.126 
 
“ordinary,” unregulated tragedy of the commons. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a 
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). 
 122. Perhaps the best example of a “pure” multiple-use, balancing statute is the Federal 
Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (2000) [hereinafter 
FLPMA]. 
 123. The FLPMA, for example, provides that, in allocating land to uses, the Bureau of Land 
Management shall “use and observe the principles of multiple use and sustained yield set forth 
in this and other applicable law.” Id. § 1711(c)(1). The statute defines “multiple use” to mean: 
[T]he management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they 
are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the 
American people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these 
resources or related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for 
periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; the use of 
some land for less than all of the resources; a combination of balanced and diverse re-
source uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations for re-
newable and non-renewable resources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range, 
timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and histori-
cal values; and harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources 
without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the 
environment with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and 
not necessarily to the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return 
or the greatest unit output. 
Id. § 1702(c). 
 124. For an examination of the political reasons why a legislature might favor such grants of 
broad administrative discretion, see Matthew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regula-
tory Structure, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721 (1985). 
 125. The three leading examples of dominant-use laws relating to the public lands are the 
Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2000), the National Park Service Organic Act, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1-20 (2000), and the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (2000). 
 126. The Wilderness Act, for example, provides that: 
[E]ach agency administering any area designated as wilderness shall be responsible for 
preserving the wilderness character of the area and shall so administer such area for 
such other purposes for which it may have been established as also to preserve its wil-
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These laws can be written in exclusive form, mandating that an 
agency only allow one particular use. They can also be written to cre-
ate presumptions in favor of particular uses.127 For example, a law 
might order that agencies allow recreational fishing, unless it can be 
shown that it will harm the resource, and prohibit commercial fishing, 
unless it can be shown that it will not harm the resource.128 
If it is assumed that agencies respond in predictable ways to the 
concentrated-diffuse dynamic, it is easy to see how the choice of a 
multiple-use or a dominant-use statute will affect the outcome of 
agency decisions. Under a multiple-use regime, the agency will consis-
tently favor the concentrated-user group. Under a dominant-use re-
gime, the agency will consistently favor the group that the legislature 
has directed or encouraged it to favor. 
However, if one also assumes that concentrated groups have the 
same amount of influence in legislative decisions that they do in 
agency decisions, then the ultimate result should be the same.129 
There are good reasons to believe, however, that concentrated 
groups probably have less influence over legislators than they do over 
agency officials.130 For one thing, legislators are directly accountable, 
through the election process, to members of the diffuse group. Fur-
 
derness character. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, wilderness areas shall 
be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, con-
servation, and historical use. 
16 U.S.C. § 1133(b). 
 127. Under the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, for example, those 
wishing to pursue an activity within a National Wildlife Refuge have the burden of proving that 
the proposed activity is “compatible” with the “major purposes” for which the refuge in ques-
tion was established. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1)(a)(1). 
 128. Land use laws, incorporating the concept of rules and variances, illustrate well the con-
cept of a presumption-based approach to ordering uses. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-800 
(1976) (revised 2004). 
 129. If this were true, the legislature would never enact multiple-use legislation at all. In-
stead, it would only pass dominant-use statutes favoring concentrated groups. 
 130. It has been posited that members of the public, including groups, have more input into 
agency processes than legislative processes. According to Peter Schuck, “the administrative 
agency is often the site where public participation in lawmaking is most accessible.” Peter H. 
Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
775, 781 (1999). Elaborating, Schuck argues that: 
The administrative agency is often the most accessible site for public participation be-
cause the costs of participating in the rulemaking and more informal agency processes, 
where many of the most important policy choices are in fact made, are likely to be 
lower than the costs of lobbying or otherwise seeking to influence Congress. Moreover, 
the institutional culture of the administrative agency, despite its often daunting opac-
ity, is probably more familiar to the average citizen, who deals with bureaucracies con-
stantly and probably works in one, than the exotic, intricate, unruly (and “un-ruley”), 
insider’s culture of Congress. 
Id. 
02__EAGLE.DOC 6/12/2006  11:04 AM 
168 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 16:143 
thermore, the legislative process features a large number of decision-
makers with a wide range of interests and thus is more difficult to in-
fluence than a small group of agency officials.131 
In the area of natural resource legislation, the empirical evidence 
supports the view that legislators are not, or do not wish to appear to 
be, overly beholden to concentrated interests. While Congress has 
designated nearly twenty percent of all public lands as dominant-use 
wilderness, available only to non-motorized recreation use, it has des-
ignated almost none as dominant-use “resource extraction areas.”132 
While the petroleum industry lobby is one of the strongest lobbies in 
America,133 there is only one place on the public lands where Con-
gress has seen fit to give it statutory priority over all other possible 
users.134 
Congress, in creating dominant-use lands, has focused its atten-
tion on the needs of less powerful user groups. This fact underlines a 
key point regarding the function that such statutes play in the overall 
management of natural resources: Dominant-use laws serve as a 
mechanism for protecting groups that do not thrive under multiple-
use regimes.135 These underpowered groups do not thrive under mul-
 
 131. For two sides of this debate (in the antitrust context), see William H. Page, Interest 
Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 618 (1987) (agencies more susceptible to capture) and John Shephard Wiley, 
Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1327 (1988) (legislature more susceptible to capture). 
 132. Wilderness statistics are available at the website of the Wilderness Institute, 
www.wilderness.net (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). The nation’s only National Petroleum Reserve, 
located on the North Slope of Alaska, is a 23 million acre tract of land originally set aside as Na-
val Petroleum Reserve, Number 4, by President Warren Harding in 1923. Exec. Order 3797-A 
(Feb. 27, 1923). Congress later enacted the reserve into law. 42 U.S.C. § 6502 (2000). As an in-
teresting side note, Naval Petroleum Reserve, Number 3, was at the center of the “Teapot 
Dome” scandal that marred the Harding administration. BURL NOGGLE, TEAPOT DOME: OIL 
AND POLITICS IN THE 1920S 16 (1962). 
 133. The petroleum industry ranks as the eighth largest contributor to Congressional 
campaigns over the last 16 years. Opensecrets.org, Industry Totals: Oil and Gas, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=E01 (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). 
 134. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 135. Dominant-use agencies serve in effect as proxies for previously under-represented 
groups. Narrow legislative mandates characterizing dominant-use agencies make them respon-
sive to their constituencies in at least two ways. First, the mandate itself forces the agency to 
conform to its mission. Second, the narrow mandate would make it easier for members of the 
“represented” constituency to seek relief in court. Courts are understandably very reluctant to 
make judgments regarding the legitimacy of multiple-use decisions. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah 
Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 55-58 (2004) (describing multiple-use management as “a de-
ceptively simple term that describes the enormously complicated task of striking a balance 
among the many competing uses to which land can be put, ‘including, but not limited to, recrea-
tion, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and [uses serving] natural scenic, sci-
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tiple-use regimes because they do not have the wherewithal to com-
pete in the agency forum with other, more powerful user groups. 
This view of agency diversity is consistent with theories of mu-
nicipal zoning and other forms of civic organization. Steele, for exam-
ple, identifies the role that zoning can play in empowering residents 
to negotiate proposed changes to their neighborhoods.136 In a world 
without zoning, individuals with greater resources are able to pur-
chase and use land without concern for the sentiments of residents. 
Through variance and special exception processes, and armed with a 
statutory presumption against nonconforming uses, residents have the 
opportunity and power to shape change.137 Notably, residents do not 
use these tools to prevent all change, but to allow for the tempered 
evolution of their neighborhoods. Steele’s study of Evanston, Illinois 
found that “over one-third of [zoning board] applications resulted in 
neither complete grants nor denials but in a partial grant or a grant 
with conditions imposed.”138 
In a recent article on civic organization,139 Gerken examines the 
potential benefits of diverse, “disaggregated” institutions in promot-
ing healthier conflict resolution. Institutions such as minority-
dominated voting districts can improve the quality of negotiations be-
tween groups of unequal power in several ways. By giving weak 
groups the opportunity to shape decisions within one jurisdiction,140 
diverse institutions force strong groups to engage on more equal 
terms,141 while at the same time helping weak groups grow stronger. 
This process accelerates as weak groups develop necessary leadership 
and use institutions they control to promote their views to the 
broader public.142 
 
entific and historical values.’”) Courts should “avoid . . . entanglement in abstract policy dis-
agreements which [they] lack both expertise and information to resolve.” Id. at 66. 
 136. Steele, supra note 25. 
 137. Id. at 713. 
 138. Id. at 724. 
 139. Gerken, supra note 27. 
 140. Id. at 1122. In at-large voting districts, the voice of minority voters is swamped by the 
voice of the majority. Minority districts, on the other hand, ensure that minorities will at least 
sometimes have “the power to decide, a power usually enjoyed solely by members of the major-
ity.” Id. at 1126. 
 141. See id. at 1145-46, 1162; Robin Martin, Minority Influence and Argument Generation, 35 
BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 91 (1996); Charlan J. Nemeth, Differential Contributions of Majority 
and Minority Influence, 93 AM. PSYCHOL. REV. 23 (1986). 
 142. Gerken, supra note 27, at 1126, 1161; see also Charlan J. Nemeth & John Rogers, Dis-
sent and the Search for Information, 35 BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 67 (1996). 
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In addition, diverse kinds of institutions are likely to order their 
decision-making in different ways.143 These differences, taken to-
gether, represent an experiment in institutional design and thus pro-
vide valuable information on what works and what does not.144 Be-
yond their experimental value, the range of institutions constitutes “a 
diverse portfolio of decision-making bodies” that can reduce risk per 
benefit in the same way that “money managers . . . maximize returns 
on investments in an unpredictable world.”145 
A. Agency Diversity 
The current system of ocean governance is one of overlaid multi-
ple-use institutions, the equivalent of at-large voting districts or un-
zoned cities. An application of zoning and disaggregation,146 in the 
form of dominant-use natural resources agencies and use-prioritized 
jurisdictions, will set the stage for a healthier political dialogue be-
tween various groups interested in ocean resources.147 
While it would be new to the oceans, this approach is not new 
elsewhere. Congress has applied an agency-diversity approach to 
managing uses on the public lands for more than 130 years.148 National 
Parks are dominant-use recreation areas, where recreation is priori-
 
 143. Gerken, supra note 27, at 1171-73. 
 144. Id. at 1172. 
 145. Id. at 1173-74. 
 146. It would also be possible to apply zoning, but not disaggregation, to the management of 
ocean space. In this model, all zones would be managed by the same agency. While this ap-
proach would improve the bargaining position of conservationists, it would not produce many of 
the other benefits described by Gerken. Under either model, it is critical that zones be deter-
mined by the legislature. A model wherein the legislature delegates zoning power to a multiple-
use agency is likely to meet the same fate as other forms of multiple-use management. 
 147. One interesting question is whether it is necessary to give “powerful” interests such as 
the fishing industry or the petroleum industry “their own” ocean space. On the one hand, pow-
erful groups do not need the same protection that weak groups need from the multiple-use fo-
rum. On the other hand, the creation of such areas may render the entire agency-diversity “pro-
ject” more politically feasible. If powerful groups see some benefit for themselves in the new 
system, they may offer less opposition to the idea. The increased certainty that would go along 
with the creation of a “Fishing Area” might provide the industry with some reason to support 
the entire project. The alternative would be to simply create conservation areas (and agencies), 
while leaving the rest of the ocean under a multiple-use regime. This is the approach Congress 
has taken with the public lands, where about thirty-five percent are managed under the 
FLPMA. Bureau of Land Management, BLM Facts, www.blm.gov/nhp/facts/index.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 1, 2005). 
 148. See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND 
RESOURCES LAW (5th ed. 2002). 
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tized over all other uses.149 National Wildlife Refuges focus on the en-
hancement of wildlife, mostly for use in waterfowl hunting, but also 
for other reasons.150 The National Forests are, or were originally, in-
tended primarily to aid in the development of a sustainable commer-
cial timber industry and to protect valuable water supplies.151 Some of 
the public lands retain multiple-use status. On these lands, the Bureau 
of Land Management has discretion to allocate between competi-
tors.152 
B. Benefits of Agency Diversity 
1. Benefits for the Conservation “Community” 
Currently, all of the United States’ oceans are the legal equiva-
lent of Bureau of Land Management lands. Under an agency-
diversity approach, where some parts of the ocean are managed by an 
agency whose prime mandate is conservation, there would be multi-
ple benefits for marine conservationists. Most obvious, conservation 
areas would represent places where conservation values were certain 
to triumph. No longer would conservation interests be merely bal-
anced with the needs of the more powerful and vocal fishing industry; 
they would intermittently prevail in undiluted form. Following 
Gerken, conservation victories—even if they directly affected only 
some parts of the ocean—would likely energize the marine conserva-
 
 149. National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2000). Conflicts that persist over 
management of the parks have arisen as interests that once “occupied” a single interest group of 
consistent uses (recreation and conservation) have, owing to increases in population and 
changes in recreation technologies, come into conflict with one another. See generally JOSEPH 
SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS (1980). 
 150. Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2000). 
 151. The National Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000), provides in 
part that: 
No public forest reservation [national forest] shall be established, except to improve 
and protect the forest within the boundaries [national forest] or for the purpose of se-
curing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of tim-
ber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States. 
The National Forest Management Act requires the Forest Service to develop forest manage-
ment plans that make allowance for other uses in the National Forests, including recreation, 
grazing, and wildlife. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3). Broad-
ening the original purpose of these lands, the Act changed the system into more of a multiple-
use system than had originally pertained. A good case can be made that this broadening was the 
catalyst for an extraordinary amount of political and legal wrangling, “highlighted” by disputes 
over the Northern Spotted Owl on National Forest lands in the Pacific Northwest. See Jeb Boyt, 
Struggling to Protect Ecosystems and Biodiversity Under NEPA and NFMA: The Ancient Forests 
of the Pacific Northwest and the Northern Spotted Owl, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1009 (1993). 
 152. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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tion community, encouraging greater participation and attracting new 
members.153 
The National Parks represent an example of how symbols can 
help energize conservation communities and increase concern among 
members of the general public. Runte wrote that, soon after creation 
of the first national parks, “scenic preservation was now in fact a 
movement. Initially only a scattering of individuals and interest 
groups supported the national parks . . . . By 1910, however, nearly 
twenty distinct organizations directly advocated scenic protection.”154 
2. Benefits for the Environment 
The existence of dominant-use ocean agencies would improve 
the health of the oceans in several ways. Areas within the jurisdiction 
of conservation-first agencies would be preserved as high quality ex-
amples of the marine environment, in the same way that our parks 
and wilderness areas allow some parts of the public lands to remain in 
relatively pristine condition.155 
In addition, agency diversity would produce systemic benefits. In 
dividing and equalizing interests, the agency diversity approach sets 
the stage for more well-balanced negotiations between those inter-
ests. “Power theory . . . provides the foundation to hypothesize that 
an asymmetrical distribution of group power will produce asymmetri-
cal negotiations, with the powerful member dominating the bargain-
ing.”156 Symmetrical power, on the other hand, results in more even 
results. These more even results are particularly important in the con-
 
 153. Gerken, supra note 27, at 1145-48; see also Susan A. Banducci et al., Minority Represen-
tation, Empowerment, and Participation, 6 J. POL. 534 (2004); Lawrence Bobo & Franklin D. 
Gilliam, Jr., Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
377 (1990). As noted above, the public’s interest in participating is currently quite low. Spruill, 
supra note 111. 
 154. RUNTE, supra note 114, at 84-85. 
 155. These areas provide ecological benefits to the enclosed area and to surrounding areas. 
Maurya B. Falkner & Thomas J. Stohlgren, Evaluating the Contribution of Small National Park 
Areas to Regional Biodiversity, 17 NAT. AREAS J. 324 (1997). 
Large national parks such as Yellowstone play a significant role in conserving intact 
ecosystems, large mammal populations, and natural processes that occur at large spa-
tial scales. Persistence of native biodiversity probably is greater in large reserves than it 
is in small reserves. However, we have demonstrated that smaller units also play a ma-
jor role in the preservation of regional biodiversity. 
Id. at 329-30. 
 156. F. Robert Dwyer & Orville C. Walker, Jr., Bargaining in an Asymmetrical Power Struc-
ture, 45 J. MARKETING 104, 106 (1981). See also Karen S. Cook & Richard M. Emerson, Power, 
Equity, and Commitment in Exchange Networks, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 721 (1978). 
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text of marine conservation where the voice of long-term sustainabil-
ity is key to attaining successful management outcomes.157 
There would be other systemic benefits as well. As Gerken ar-
gues, diverse institutions allow and encourage experimentation in 
management strategies.158 Where the ocean is managed uniformly, 
opportunities for experimentation are limited. Where, however, it is 
managed by a diverse set of agencies, each agency would have the 
opportunity to experiment. On the public lands, for example, each 
federal land management agency—the Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
National Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service, and the Bureau of 
Land Management—implements its own strategies for conserving 
wildlife and managing Wilderness Areas within its respective jurisdic-
tion.159 Experimentation is safer when carried out on parts of the sys-
tem and may lead to new knowledge supporting improved manage-
ment in other jurisdictions. 
Disaggregated agencies also represent a way to manage risk 
across the entire system by incorporating a portfolio approach to 
management.160 While multiple-use areas place “all the eggs in one 
basket” through balancing, the application of a range of approaches 
across the seascape lessens chances of system-wide failure. This kind 
of diversified approach is particularly valuable where scientific infor-
mation is sparse and uncertainty is high.161 Because of the daunting 
physical attributes of the marine environment, namely its scale and 
 
 157. See supra note 117 and accompanying text; see also Michael S. Chwe, Minority Voting 
Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1999). 
 158. Gerken, supra note 27, at 1172. 
 159. Wilderness Areas are “overlay” designations. That is, they exist as parts of other 
“primary” types of public land, such as National Forests or National Parks. Bureau of Land 
Management wilderness regulations can be found at 43 C.F.R. § 6300 (2005). Forest Service 
wilderness regulations are located throughout the agency’s regulations. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R § 
251.114 (2005) (ingress and egress to private holdings across wilderness areas). The Park Service 
has issued park-specific regulations for wilderness areas within individual parks. See, e.g., 36 
C.F.R 7.45 (2005) (Everglades National Park). Each agency has also issued “wilderness 
policies,” generally located in their agency manuals. Wilderness.net, http://www.wilderness.net/ 
index.cfm?fuse=NWPS&sec=legisPolicy (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). 
 160. See Markowitz, supra note 28. 
 161. Some have already made this argument in support of the creation of marine reserves. 
Donna Christie argues that “[t]he inherent uncertainty in science and variability in ecosystems 
necessitates measures to insure the intergenerational rights in regard to the diversity and quality 
of, and access to, marine living resources. Marine reserves can provide that ‘insurance policy’ 
for future generations.” Donna R. Christie, Marine Reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and Int-
ergenerational Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 427, 434 (2004). See also Jane Lubchenco et 
al., Plugging a Hole in the Ocean: The Emerging Science of Marine Reserves, 13 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS S-3 (2003). 
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difficult working conditions, marine science is characterized by ex-
tremely high levels of uncertainty.162 
An energized and expanded marine conservation community is 
likely to improve the level of public debate regarding the oceans in 
general. If dominant-use mandates are structured as presumptions 
rather than as simple exclusions, members of concentrated groups 
would have an incentive to engage in productive public debates about 
conservation.163 Presumptions also have great potential to aid in gen-
erating better scientific information about the marine environment 
and economic uses of its resources. To the extent, for example, that 
fishing groups must meet a high burden of proof before being permit-
ted to fish within a conservation-first area, they will have every incen-
tive to invest in information gathering and analysis. Because—unlike 
the conservation community—they will earn money from their ocean 
use, the fishing industry is in better position to make these invest-
ments.164 
3. Disadvantages 
Although agency diversity offers some potential benefits as a 
governance strategy, there are some potential costs and drawbacks as 
well. While the system could be implemented without creation of any 
new federal or state agencies—Congress or state legislatures could 
 
 162. Marc Mangel, Irreducible Uncertainties, Sustainable Fisheries and Marine Reserves, 2 
EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY RES. 547 (2000). 
 163. Healthier negotiations would reduce conflicts and the costs associated with conflicts. 
According to a 2002 study by the National Academy for Public Administration, the number of 
lawsuits filed by interest groups against the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
increased by several hundred percent between 1990 and 2002. NAT’L. ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., 
COURTS, CONGRESS, AND CONSTITUENCIES: MANAGING FISHERIES BY DEFAULT (2002). 
 164. The example of oil drilling on public land illustrates how “turning the tables,” as 
Gerken puts it, can generate new information. Gerken, supra note 27, at 1142-46. Currently, the 
Bureau of Land Management has leased, or offers for leasing, over 200 million acres of western 
public lands to private firms for oil and gas production. These 200 million acres represent a sig-
nificant percentage of all BLM lands and a significant percentage of all federal public lands in 
the United States. Moreover, many of the areas offered for drilling are located near population 
centers, such as Los Angeles, Denver, Portland, and Seattle. However, these leases and leasing 
offers are rarely mentioned in the media or elsewhere in public debate. See Environmental 
Working Group, Who Owns the West?, http://www.ewg.org/oil_and_gas/execsumm.php (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2005). Compare the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, where the total area pro-
posed for exploration totals about 1.5 million acres. Artic National Wildlife Refuge, 
http://www.anwr.org/backgrnd/where.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). Searching the phrase 
“Arctic National Wildlife Refuge” in a database of newspaper articles published in the United 
States in the first eleven months of 2005 returned more the 3,000 “hits.” In the case of the Arctic 
refuge, the powerful group (oil and gas) has been forced to generate information about the eco-
logical impacts of its activities by the strong legal presumption against drilling in the refuge. 
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simply expand the jurisdictions of existing land management agencies 
to include ocean areas—management agencies would need to expand 
their size and institutional capacities to serve their new functions. 
This would require additional funding. More important, the new sys-
tem would not address, and would perhaps temporarily exacerbate, 
the fractured-authority problem identified by both ocean commis-
sions as an obstacle to good management. Under the agency-diversity 
model, the ocean would be further divided into a larger number of 
“jurisdictional pieces.” This kind of division is inconsistent with the 
ecosystem management concept of holism.165   
The ultimate goal of agency diversity, though, is that the agencies 
representing various interests will ultimately negotiate a solution to 
their differences. While there is some risk that this reconciliation may 
never occur, there is also some anecdotal evidence from the public 
lands context that it can. In the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 
there are a number of natural resources and uses that flow or migrate 
across the jurisdictional boundaries of land management agencies. 
Grizzly bears, for example, traverse lands managed by three different 
federal agencies: the Park Service, the Forest Service, and the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service.166 To deal with issues such as grizzly bear 
management, the three agencies established the Greater Yellowstone 
Coordinating Committee (“GYCC”), which serves to facilitate nego-
tiated agreements.167 Results from these negotiations appear to sup-
port predictions of the extra-jurisdictional benefit of disaggregated in-
stitutions. While the proposed reintroduction of grizzly bears onto 
 
 165. Cortner et al., supra note 53, at 160-61. 
 166. L. Eberhart & R. Knight, How Many Grizzlies in Yellowstone?, 60 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 
416 (1996). 
 167. According to its website: 
The Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee (GYCC) was formed between the 
National Park Service and US Forest Service in 1964 through a signed Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU). The MOU provides for mutual cooperation and coordina-
tion in the management of core federal lands in the Greater Yellowstone area. The 
MOU was again revised in 2002 to reflect the inclusion of the US Fish and Wildlife 
Service on the Coordinating Committee. The committee consists of the National Park 
Service Rocky Mountain Regional Director, the National Forest Service Intermoun-
tain Regional Forester, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Mountain Prairie Re-
gional Director; Park Superintendents from Yellowstone and Grand Teton National 
Parks; Forest Supervisors from the Beaverhead-Deerlodge, Bridger-Teton, Caribou-
Targhee, Custer, Gallatin, and Shoshone National Forests; Refuge Manager from the 
National Elk Refuge (also represents the interests of Red Rock Lakes National Wild-
life Refuge). 
The Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee, The GYCC-Who We Are, 
http://mpin.nbii.org/gycc/aboutus/index.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). In addition to grizzly 
bears, the committee works together on a wide range of other cross-cutting issues, including air 
and water quality, the spread of wildlife diseases, recreation trails, and forest fires. 
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Forest Service lands elsewhere has experienced lengthy delays,168 the 
Forest Service agreed, through a GYCC process, to manage National 
Forest lands surrounding Yellowstone National Park for the benefit 
of grizzlies.169 During this period of interagency cooperation, bear 
populations in the greater Yellowstone area have increased by 300%, 
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is considering removing the 
Yellowstone population from its list of endangered species.170 Al-
though this is but one story, it indicates that dominant-use agencies 
have the potential to influence decisions made by their multiple-use 
neighbors for the betterment of their “neighborhood.” 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although the Pew and U.S. Commissions accurately identify cur-
rent laws and institutions as one of the primary causes of the de-
graded marine environment, their solutions do not account for the 
fact that institutional failure is due in large part to problems inherent 
in multiple-use management. More comprehensive agencies, charged 
with balancing more interests, are not only unlikely to address this 
problem, but they are likely to exacerbate it. 
An agency diversity model, which incorporates mandatory repre-
sentation of diffuse public interests, is a solution that fits the specific 
problem of marine conservation.171 Although there are some potential 
 
 168. In the late 1990s, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supported by environmental 
groups, pushed for the reintroduction of grizzlies into the Selway-Bitterroot and Frank Church-
River of No Return Wilderness areas on Forest Service land in Idaho. A plan was initially ap-
proved. Sherry Devlin, Grizzlies Invited Back to the Bitterroot, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Dec. 4, 
2000. However, based on opposition from, among others, then-head of the U.S. Forest Service 
Dale Bosworth, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton decided not to go forward with the rein-
troductions. Environmental News Service, Grizzly Bears Will Not Be Reintroduced into U.S. 
West, June 21, 2001, http://ens-newswire.com/ens/jun2001/2001-06-21-03.asp. 
 169. INTERAGENCY GRIZZLY BEAR COMMITTEE, YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM 
SUBCOMMITTEE, FIVE-YEAR WORKPLAN, http://www.fs.fed.us/r1/wildlife/igbc/Subcommittee/ 
yes/YES_5-year.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2005) (Forest Service agrees to “to incorporate the 
Conservation Strategy habitat and monitoring requirements into . . . 6 Forest Plans.”). 
 170. Juliet Eilperin, Grizzlies May Lose Status as “Threatened”, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005, 
at A3. 
 171. A recent news report illustrates the application of dominant-use zoning as a tool for 
resolving environmental conflicts. Clifford Krauss, Canada to Shield 5 Million Forest Acres, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at A6. To resolve long-standing disputes over logging in the Great 
Bear Rain Forest, “an improbable assemblage of officials from the . . . government, coastal Na-
tive Canadian nations, logging companies and environmental groups” agreed to put five million 
acres “off-limits to loggers.” In exchange, the loggers “will be guaranteed the right to work in 10 
million acres of forest . . . but they will be obliged to cut selectively: away from critical water-
sheds, bear dens and fish spawning grounds.” Id. 
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drawbacks to this approach, it also promises a wide range of compel-
ling benefits. Congress should consider these benefits seriously if and 
when it takes on the issue of ocean-governance reform. 
In the legislative process, Congress will have to work out difficult 
problems regarding the initial allocation of ocean space to uses.172 Al-
though a formidable task, it could be accomplished with the help of 
an ocean planning commission charged with recommending initial, 
spatial allocations. Congress’ effort to limit the amount of American 
oceans dedicated to multiple-use would be rewarded with a healthier 
marine environment benefiting the fishing industry, consumers, and 
future generations of Americans. 
 
 172. The initial allocation of ocean space to the range of uses would be challenging, but not 
impossible. The most useful analogy for purposes of thinking about this enterprise is the mu-
nicipal zoning model, in which, after gathering information about the area to be zoned, a plan-
ning commission makes recommendations to the local government body about where various 
kinds of zones ought to be located. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 
637-40 (2d ed. 2005). 
